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Colombian Migration to South Florida: A Most Unwelcome Reception 
 
By  Michael W. Collier, Ph.D. 
 Latin American and Caribbean Center 
 Florida International University 
 
“Here [Colombia], I am a professional. There [South Florida], I was nobody.” 
     Colombian Migrant (quoted in Robles, 2003) 
Introduction 
 
The Economist (2002) characterizes the late 1990s and early 2000s wave of migration 
from Latin America as a “hemorrhage.”  Unlike previous periods of Latin American migration 
consisting mainly of working-class persons in search of economic opportunities, this latest wave 
of migration by middle and upper-middle class is draining the region of many of its most 
educated and talented citizens.  Colombia presents a classic case of economic, political, and 
social turmoil in Latin America where a middle and upper-middle class “brain drain” took place 
in the period 1996-2002.  Colombia’s internal civil war, combined with historically high crime 
rates, spawn some of the highest levels of violence in the world.  In the late 1990s, the 
Colombian middle and upper-middle classes came under increasing threats of kidnapping and 
extortion by a complex mix of guerillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers.  As former 
Colombian President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) sought a negotiated peace settlement with the 
FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Colombia’s largest guerilla group, the 
insurgents instead used the 1999-2001 peace talks as a ruse for strengthening their forces and 
subsequently moved their attacks from rural areas into Colombia’s major cities.  The boldness of 
the Colombian guerillas is evident in the April 2000 “war tax” imposed by the FARC on 
Colombian citizens with more than U.S. $1 million in assets—with kidnapping or death the 
punishment for not paying.   
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In addition to its political violence problems, in the late 1990s, the Colombian economy 
spiraled into deep recession, bottoming out in 1999 when the Colombian GDP contracted by 
5.0% while the country’s unemployment rate reached 20%.  The combination of increasing 
personal threats and economic downturn coincides with many professional Colombians “voting 
with their feet” through migration to safer and more economically stable countries, such as Costa 
Rica, the United States, and Spain.  This mass exodus of Colombian professionals no doubt left 
the Colombian government wondering if this migration trend would reverse itself and allow 
these talented citizens to eventually return and help develop their home country. 
Thousands of Colombian migrants began arriving in South Florida beginning in the mid 
1990s.  No one knows how many Colombians have made the trip to South Florida.  The 2000 
U.S. census identified 100,216 Colombians in South Florida—a figure not adjusted for the 40% 
to 50% of those estimated to be living in the region but out of status (lacking legal visas) 
(interview with Miami Colombian Consul, 2000).  Unlike the more numerous Cuban migrants, 
Colombians in South Florida are nearly invisible—economically, politically, and socially.   
In Fall 2000, the Florida International University (FIU) Latin American and Caribbean 
Center (LACC) began a research project to study this relatively unknown group of recent 
migrants to South Florida.  A group of graduate students in LACC’s Master’s of Arts in Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies degree program initiated the study—several of them being 
recent Colombian migrants.  These students sought a deeper understanding of the wave of 
middle and upper-middle class Colombians flowing into South Florida.  After a year of pilot 
research, the project expanded into three Master’s thesis projects (Casey, 2002; Franco, 2002; 
and Robertson, 2002).  This article is a summary of the findings of this project’s pilot and thesis 
research with a focus on two specific research questions:  Why are Colombians migrating to 
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South Florida?  Why, after only a short time in South Florida, are these migrants returning to 
Colombia?  Using a rival theories approach, the theoretical contribution of this article is its 
demonstration of the complexity of the recent Colombian migration wave.  Methodologically, 
this article reveals that a number of competing hypotheses are needed to substantially explain 
such complex behavior as the recent Colombian migration wave.   
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  
The FIU research team quickly found that with the exception of numerous journalistic 
articles and books describing the role of Colombian’s in South Florida’s drug trade, there were 
no scholarly studies of Colombians migrating to the region.  Studies did exist on Colombian 
migrants living in the greater New York and Los Angeles regions (Guarnizo et al., 1999) and on 
the transnational linkages of Colombian working-class migrants (Guarnizo and Diaz, 1999), but 
the literature lacked studies of Colombians migrating to South Florida.  This lack of research 
attention to Colombian migrants to the region explains why a descriptive summary of the team’s 
pilot research on the South Florida Colombian Diaspora (Collier and Gamarra, 2001) received 
wide coverage in the local South Florida, U.S. national, and Latin American medias. 
 A review of the scholarly migration literature found several rival theories that could 
explain the recent migration of Colombia ’s middle and upper-middle classes. These rival 
theories all follow a general rational choice approach.  The theories include the Classic Push-Pull 
(Microeconomic Equilibrium); Exit, Voice Loyalty; Social Dislocation; Network/Social Capital, 
and Expanded Push-Pull theories.  These theories assume that an agent (e.g., individual migrant 
or head of household) is a rational actor whose behavior is motivated by a conscious calculation 
of advantages.  Rational choice theory assumes that agents have goals or objectives and a 
number of options for action that will attain these goals or objectives.  As rational decision-
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makers, agents rank order their preferred options or actions based on their ability to achieve their 
goals or objectives.  Rational choice theory takes into account that agents may not have complete 
information to support their decision process and may differ in their aversions to risk (Morrow, 
1994, ch 2; Allison and Zelikow, 1999, ch 1).  
The major differences in these rival migration theories are in their use of economic, 
political or social factors that identify the most important in influencing an agent’s decision to 
migrate.  Except for the interdisciplinary Expanded Push-Pull Theory, the other rational choice-
based theories are mainly single-discipline theories that offer only one or two primary factors for 
agents deciding to migrate.   A through review of these rational choice-based theories is 
impossible in this short article, so the following discussion focuses only on the propositions each 
theory offers for answering our two research questions on why the Colombian middle and upper-
middle classes are migrating to South Florida, and why they are returning to Colombia after only 
a year or two away from their home country.   
Ravenstein (1889) was one of the earliest migration theorists whose work led to the 
development of Classic Push-Pull or Microeconomic Equilibrium Theory.  He offered that 
people migrate because of an inherent desire in most men to better themselves materially.  The 
theory offers that people tend to leave areas characterized by surplus population, unemployment, 
and poverty and are attracted to areas with growing employment and better wages.  While this 
theory worked well to explain the 1800s and 1900s migrations from Europe and Asia to the 
United States, and the pre-1995 general migration of Latin Americans to the United States, it is 
too simplistic for today’s Colombian case as the explanatory factors are mainly economic.   
 Hirschman (1970) offers a more sophisticated model for migration studies during periods 
of societal crisis or decline.  His Exit, Voice, Loyalty (EVL) model designates that when a 
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person sees no other viable solution to a crisis or decline, and possessing the requisite resources 
or means to relocate, they will desert or escape—i.e., Exit—the situation.  Voice takes place 
when the person sees viable solutions to the societal crisis or decline and is willing to remain and 
articulate opposition to societal conditions or work toward solutions.  Loyalty comes into play 
when the person continues to award societal institutions and leaders their loyalty, despite the 
societal crisis or decline.  While the societal crisis or decline may involve economic, political, or 
social conditions—the EVL Model finds primary use in explaining behavior in the face of 
declining political institutions and loss of trust in governments.     
 Social Dislocation Theory attempts to explain the migration of people who experience 
altered societal roles (Isbister, 1996, 99).  This theory maintains that people will not migrate if 
they have a secure niche in their family or community, especially if they are in a position where 
they are expected and able to fill a role that their parents or grandparents before them filled.  
However, when a person’s family or community role changes or becomes tenuous, or their larger 
social environment becomes uncertain, they are likely to migrate in search of social certainty.  
This theory normally attributes the migrant’s dislocation to a change in their economic status as 
the result of disruptions in the world capitalist system.   Sassen (1988, 1991) asserts that persons 
who migrate due to dislocation will follow similar paths to those of international capital flows, 
including to global cities that become the hubs for international financial matters.  Sassen offers 
that Miami serves as the international financial center for Latin America and the Caribbean and 
thus would be expected to be primary destination for migrants from the region.  Portes and 
Rumbaut (1996, 84) add to Social Dislocation Theory by arguing that a major factor in the 
success of migrants re- locating concerns the context in the receiving state—i.e., relocation is 
facilitated in states where work visas and refugee status are easily obtained.   
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 Massey et al. (1993) offer that Network Theory explains migration flows along the lines 
of existing social networks.  This theory holds that family or friends who have already migrated 
encourage persons to migrate to the same location where the family or friends now reside.  
Guarnizo et al. (1999, 370) recognize social capital as a major factor in the adaptation of new 
migrants.  Social capital entails the nature and strength of social networks, levels of social trust, 
and norms for personal interactions in the family, neighborhood, community, and workplace 
(Putnam, 2000).  Network/Social Capital Theory proposes that if social capital is high on both 
ends of the migration stream, then the migrants are more likely to establish strong networks at 
the receiving location and integrate quickly into the new society.  If social capital is low on one 
or both ends of the migration stream, then it will be more difficult for the migrants to adapt on 
the receiving end.   
Finally, in recognition that the decision to migrate is complex, scholars have attempted to 
broaden the Classic Push-Pull (Microeconomic Equilibrium) Theory into a more robust 
Expanded Push-Pull Theory (Boyle et al., 1998).  This theory offers a number of economic, 
political, and social factors tend to both push migrants from their home locations and pull 
migrants to their intermediate or final destinations.  Similar to Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of 
human needs, the reasons a person might be pushed to migrate or pulled to a specific migration 
destination could run the gamut of human needs including the search for physiological needs 
(food, shelter, etc.), safety and security, love or acceptance, esteem or recognition, and self-
actualization.  Thus, of all the rational choice-based theories, Expanded Push-Pull can include 
the most diverse causal conditions and accommodate the most complex causal models. 
 The above discussion reveals that a number of rival theories are available for explaining 
the latest wave of migration from Colombia.  Table 1 provides a summary of the competing 
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hypotheses associated with each rival theory discussed above and indicates the results of this 
research project’s hypothesis tests.  Under each research question in Table 1 are listed the 
primary causal conditions (explanatory factors) that are included in each competing hypothesis.  
Table 1 also displays secondary causal conditions included in the causal models for each theory.  
These secondary conditions often perform an antecedent role that triggers changes to the primary 
causal conditions.  The Findings section of this article provides additional details of the evidence 
used to assess each hypothesis tested in Table 1.   
<Place Table 1 near here> 
Research Design 
 This research project mounted a multi-method data collection effort.  The project began 
its pilot research in Fall 2000 with interviews of officials in South Florida’s Colombian service 
organizations (Lions clubs, Kiwanis clubs, Colombian American Service Association (CASA), 
Colombian Coalition, etc.), the Miami Colombian Consulate, and other entities that were in 
regular contact with Colombian migrants (Radio Caracol, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, etc.).  These interviews provided the initial evaluation of conditions in the Colombian 
Diaspora from those organizations and agencies assisting Colombian migrants in settling in 
South Florida.  In Spring 2001, the researchers conducted a series of three focus groups with 30 
Colombians who had migrated to South Florida over the past five years.  See Table 2 for a 
summary of the focus group participants.  The data collected from the focus groups closely 
matched the results from the initial interviews.   
<Place Table 2 near here> 
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   Three graduate students in the research team expanded on the pilot research with their 
Master’s thesis projects.  Franco (2002) concentrated on the process of recent Colombian 
migration, investigating their pre-migration information gathering processes, expectations 
generated before migrating, and disillusionments of migrants after arriving in South Florida.  Her 
research included a series of repeated interviews and observations of eight migrants and their 
families in South Florida and six soon to be migrants and their families in Medellín, Colombia.  
Her ethnography of these migrants and their families informed Classic and Expanded Push-Pull, 
Social Dislocation, and Network/Social Capital theories.  Robertson (2002) employed the Exit, 
Voice, and Loyalty Theory in the investigation of how Colombians were dealing with the decline 
of their political institutions.  Using the pilot research for her primary Exit data, she then 
conducted 98 interviews in Medellín and Bogotá, Colombia of persons displaying Voice and 
Loyalty behavior.  Casey (2002) utilized Network/Social Capital Theory in her investigation of 
the adaptation of Colombian migrants in South Florida.  Besides the pilot research, she collected 
data from repeated interviews and observation of 12 migrants and their families in South Florida.  
Summaries of the pilot and thesis research are included in the following Findings section. 
 The three theses and this article follow a pattern-matching analysis procedure.  This 
procedure calls for the researcher to match the data collected with the predicted relationships in 
each study’s causal model.  Table 1 summarizes the multiple competing hypotheses tested for 
this article.  The pilot and theses research employed nominal measurements for all qualitative 
causal conditions with the data collection focused on finding convincing evidence of whether the 
condition existed or not.  A purposive sampling method was employed, whereby interview and 
focus group subjects were selected based on their being cognizant of the information desired.  A 
snowball sampling procedure was utilized to identify interview and focus group subjects in 
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South Florida—meaning initial subjects were identified from CASA and the Colombian 
Coalition telephone lists and these subjects were then asked to identify additional subjects.   In 
Colombia, thesis researchers used networks of family and friends, combined with snowballing 
procedures, to identify subjects.   
Because a representative sample was not used in this project, the generalizability of the 
project results is limited to the subjects of the focus groups and the thesis interviews and 
observations—approximately 50 subjects in South Florida and 100 in Colombia.  The lack of a 
representative sample and the qualitative nominal measurement of all causal conditions are the 
two major biases contained in this study.  This bias is somewhat lessened by the strong 
correlation of the data collected in the pilot research and theses with both journalistic 
investigations of the Diaspora and the research team’s continuing interactions with Colombian 
service organizations who were in contact with hundreds of Colombian migrants.  Thus, the 
magnitude and direction of the biases should not affect the hypothesis tests in Table 1 as these 
results are generalized to the specific subjects of the focus groups and thesis interviews and 
observations.  Because of the small sample employed, this research is limited to only advancing 
and not testing the theories summarized in this article. 
Findings 
Table 1 summarizes the hypothesis tests in this article.  All hypotheses were supported 
with varying degrees of strength.  The Table 1 findings, arranged by rival theory, are discussed 
further below. 
Classic Push-Pull Migration Theory 
Throughout history, the push and pull of economic factors has been one of the strongest 
motivations for migrants to relocate to the United States.  In the case of the 1996-2002 migration 
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of Colombian middle and upper-classes to South Florida, economic opportunities were identified 
as an important factor—but not the strongest factor.  Table 3 provides the results of a pre-focus 
group survey that asked recent Colombian migrants the factors most important in their decision 
to migrate. 
<Place Table 3 near here> 
Table 3 reveals that economic factors rated low on the list (seventh and ninth) of the most 
influential factors in Colombian focus group participants’ decisions to migrate to South Florida.   
Focus group participants widely discussed the late 1990s decline in employment opportunities 
and their frustrations with finding jobs in Colombia, where family networks were more important 
than the education or professional experience of the applicants.  Other project subjects reported 
this same Colombian employment situation based on “who you know” instead of “what you 
know.”  One of Franco’s (2002) subjects summarized her employment problems in Colombia as:  
“I was looking for a job for one and one-half years and I did not find one.  Everything here [in 
Colombia] is managed with connections.  I had interviews, but generally they chose the boss’s 
nephew” (quoted in Franco, 2002, 41). 
 Migrants looking for work in South Florida faced a number of frustrations—a very 
unfriendly welcoming context—which it appears eventually caused many to return to Colombia.  
With personal connections as the primary factor in obtaining Colombian employment, writing 
resumes and the etiquette of job interviews were skills few migrants initially possessed when 
they arrived in South Florida.  Colombian service organizations provide new arrivals instruction 
on these critical job search skills.  However, even beyond resume writing and interview skills, 
the main reasons that pilot project subjects reported as difficulties in finding employment in 
South Florida were the lack of a permanent or work visa and lack of English language skills.  
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These employment problems were particularly serious for Colombian professionals who could 
not take the U.S. licensing examinations in their field.  As a result, many Colombian migrants 
worked illegally in South Florida and took what they considered menial jobs.  As one Colombian 
migrant reported on why he returned to Colombia after three and one-half years in South Florida: 
The majority of us go there [South Florida] with money thinking that in one month you’ll 
have everything you had at home.  Ninety-nine percent ended up waiters and at valet 
parking.  I had education and status [in Colombia]—to become a car-parker?  I did it all.  
I mopped floors.  I delivered flowers.  I cleaned bathrooms.  I cried.   (quoted in Robles, 
2003)    
 
 Florida State Representative Juan Zapata, (Republican-Miami), and former Director of 
CASA, offers “Those who left Colombia for economic reasons went back the quickest.  The 
situation here (in South Florida) is not easy.  Since the situation in Colombia has improved 
somewhat, they’re going back” (quoted in Robles, 2003).  Zapata reported how when CASA 
hosted a late 2003 professional fair to help migrants with professional licensing and visa 
problems, most of CASA’s telephone list had returned to Colombia (Robles, 2003).  
Exit, Voice, Loyalty Theory 
Focus group participants, who had all decided to Exit Colombia, reported feeling there 
were no solutions to Colombia’s problems as the third most important factor in their decision to 
migrate (see Table 3).  Fifty four percent of participants reported this as a factor in their decision 
to leave Colombia.  The Exit, Voice, Loyalty theory connects this feeling of hopelessness with 
several of the political and economic factors in Table 1 which led migrants to relocate to South 
Florida.  It is interesting to note that in Robertson’s (2002) interviews with Voice and Loyalty 
subjects in Colombia with the resources to migrate, almost all reported still having hope for 
solutions to Colombia’s problems—the major reason they had not exited Colombia.   
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Robertson (2002) concludes her study of Exit subjects by offering that “it was this 
group’s lack of confidence in the state institutions’ abilities to recover from ineffectiveness, 
exacerbated by declines in freedoms that were the most salient factors for exit” (Robertson 2002, 
71).   While the research shows upper class members leaving Colombia for security reasons and 
middle class members exiting for economic purposes, “the research also depicts the wealthy 
fleeing to protect their economic [status]….” (Robertson, 2002, 70).  For these subjects, “the 
Colombian government, along with the institutional structure within which it operates, [had] lost 
both credibility and control” (Robertson, 2002, 70).   
 Evidence is sketchy on those who return to Colombia after initially losing hope of 
solutions to Colombia’s problems.  Robles (2003) reports how many believe that the return 
migration to Colombia demonstrates a new feeling of optimism about Colombia.  Journalistic 
and political pundits offer that after decades of conflict in Colombia, the new hard- line policy 
with guerilla and rightist paramilitary fighters implemented by President Alvaro Uribe, who took 
office in mid-2002, has given Colombians a new sense of hope.  While the journalistic reporting 
on the return migration to Colombia due to new hope is compelling, further interview and survey 
work is required to confirm the magnitude and causes of this reverse migration. 
Social Dislocation Theory 
As Table 3 depicts, the increase in violence and decrease in economic opportunities in 
Colombia have most certainly manifested changes to many Colombian’s social status and 
environment.  Franco (2002) highlights that “(m)any Colombians feel they have an uncertain 
future in their country, that their social roles are limited, that the chaos generated by violence is 
unbearable, and that it is too difficult to pursue a “promising future” with the current 
circumstances”(Franco, 2002, 8).   Therefore, as reported by almost all of the South Florida 
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subjects in this project, Colombians began to migrate to the United States in search of the 
“American Dream.” 
The American Dream was not what most middle and upper-middle class Colombians 
found in South Florida.  Instead, the uncertainty of their living conditions remained, if not 
increased, after relocating to South Florida.  Colombians did not find a welcoming context in the 
United States.  Despite the ongoing civil war in their home state, Colombians never received the 
blanket Temporary Protected Status (TPS) offered to other Latin American migrant groups from 
war-torn countries.  The failure to receive TPS can be traced to two factors: (1) President 
Pastrana initially characterized the late 1990’s “brain drain” as being for economic reasons, and 
(2) a strong lobbying effort of the U.S. government for Colombian TPA was never mounted.  
Instead of obtaining TPS or easily qualifying for refugee status, the inability to obtain permanent 
or work visas (the number one problem reported by focus group participants), the threat of 
deportation for those who overstayed tourist visas or entered the U.S. without a visa, the inability 
to find professiona l positions while being relegated to menial labor, and the lack of resources to 
quickly establish a lifestyle similar to what they lived in Colombia, all contributed to the 
uncertainty of living in South Florida.  These factors led many Colombians to feel they had 
dropped significantly in social class.  
Colombia is an extremely class conscious country—so much so that an informal class or 
economic strata rating scale of one to six, with six being highest, is used by Colombians.  Focus 
group participants reported an average drop of almost two social strata on the Colombian 
informal scale after their arrival in South Florida (see Table 2)—a situation leading to extreme 
social tension in Colombian households.   
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 Statements like the opening quote in this article indicate the frustration Colombians 
experienced over their loss of social position on migrating to South Florida.  Franco (2002) 
concluded from her ethnographic work with Colombian migrants: 
…migration to the United States ends up being shocking to many people.  The middle 
and upper-middle classes have attained a social status in Colombia over the course of 
several generations.   Even if they are not swimming in dollars, the majority has social 
recognition and access to certain luxuries…..Unless immigrants are wealthy, have an 
attractive job offer, or embark on a successful business venture, it is very probable that 
their social and economic status will decrease in South Florida…. (Franco, 2002, 93) 
  
 Of all the variables in Table 1 supporting why Colombians are returning to their home 
country, their inability to reestablish a stable environment, combined with a loss of social class, 
was found to be among the strongest factors in explaining the return migration. 
Network/Social Capital Theory 
Both the pilot and thesis research found strong evidence of the role that family and 
friends played in influencing Colombians to migrate to South Florida—likely the strongest factor 
explaining why Colombians chose to migrate to South Florida over other locations.  Franco 
(2002) describes how the migrants use these networks of family and friends as the informal 
source of information on the migration process, which creates unrealistic expectations in the 
migrants concerning the ease of finding the “American Dream” in South Florida.  Rather than 
consult official U.S. embassy, consulate, or Immigration and Naturalization Service information 
sources, family and friends would offer potential migrants a rosy picture of the ease in getting 
permanent U.S. visas, finding employment, and reestablishing their Colombian lifestyles in 
South Florida—all which turned out not to be true.  Instead, Colombian migrants to South 
Florida, after living with family and friends already established in South Florida, became 
disillusioned and experienced increasing social tension as family and friends often did little to 
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help the migrants find employment and began asking for payment of room and board to help 
support host families.   
In the case of Colombian migrants moving to South Florida, there are low levels of social 
capital on both ends of the migration stream.  Sudarsky (2001) uncovered a low level of social 
capital in Colombia when measured in a country-wide survey.  Colombia’s particular type of 
social capital is best described by what Putnam (2000) defines as “bonding” social capital where 
the strength of social networks is primarily with persons closest to the individual, i.e., family and 
close friends.  Colombian’s lack strong “bridging” social capital, which is the ability to network 
and establish social relations with persons outside the immediate family and close friends.  This 
strength of “bonding” over “bridging” social capital is evident in the priorities Colombians use to 
describe their personal identity, which in ascending order includes: (1) family, (2) close friends, 
(3) socioeconomic class, and (4) region of Colombia (paisas, costeños, caleños, etc.) (Collier and 
Gamarra, 2001).  This project found identification with Colombian political parties and the sense 
of a larger Colombian nation as substantially missing in those who migrated from Colombia.  In 
fact, when Colombians both in South Florida and Colombia were asked what made them the 
most proud of being a Colombian—the answers were almost always “the people” or “the 
territory,” but never the Colombian state or its institutions (Collier and Gamarra, 2001, 14; 
Robertson, 2002, 111).   
Colombian “bonding” social capital, results in small closed social networks (Casey, 2002, 
85) and helps explain both why Colombian migrants tend to not live in enclaves as do other 
migrant groups in South Florida, but instead live scattered among South Florida communities 
that reflect their social class in Colombia.  Low “bonding” social capital also explains why 
Colombians have difficulty finding employment assistance outside their immediate family or 
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social circle in South Florida.  Casey (2002) documented several cases where “bonding” social 
capital began to weaken as both new Colombian migrants and their host family and friends 
became frustrated over the inability of the migrants to find employment and establish their own 
homes in the region.   
South Florida has its own problems with low social capital, which contributes to the 
problems Colombians have in settling in the region.  Instead of a U.S. “melting pot,” South 
Florida tends to be a “patchwork quilt” of communities characterized by strong enclaves of 
ethnic and social class-based groups—groups that have limited inter-group interaction.  Portes 
and Stepick (1993) detail how the Cuban enclave that developed in Miami in the 1960s and 
1970s, a case where Cuban migrants assisted others in building businesses and finding 
employment, explains the rapid rise in economic and political power that Cubans now hold over 
Miami.  Both the pilot research interviews and focus group participants revealed the extreme 
difficulty that Colombians migrants have encountered in penetrating the still strong Cuban 
enclave in search of employment or other assistance.   
Putnam (2000) estimates that social capital in Florida is low, only slightly higher than 
U.S. states in the deep South (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee) with 
the lowest U.S. social capital due in part to social tensions over slavery and racial discrimination 
that have still not been adequately resolved.  A 2003 statewide survey of social capital in Florida 
found that South Florida displayed significantly lower social capital than other state regions 
(Collier, 2004).  Thus, South Florida has the lowest social capital in a state with some of the 
lowest social capital in the nation—not an ideal migration destination according to Guarnizo et 
al. (1999).  This also helps explain the difficulty that Colombian migrants have in finding 
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employment or other assistance in South Florida—a region little disposed to social networking 
outside of established ethnic or social groups.  
The story of Christina (pseudonym) who migrated to South Florida in 1999 reveals the 
effects of the lack of social support on migrants’ decision to return to Colombia.  Initially living 
with her sister, three months later Christina moved into a one-bedroom apartment with her 
husband and daughter.  A business administration specialist in Colombia, Christina could only 
find work as a maid, cleaning lady, and babysitter in South Florida.  With her husband sick, 
Christina’s employment and a U.S. $1000 monthly check from her father in Colombia, which 
barely covered her monthly rent, was her family’s only income.  Even with her sister’s family 
living nearby, her husband and daughter with her in the United States, and residing in a modern, 
secure South Florida community, Christina reported: 
I missed the warmness of my family, walking out on the streets [in Colombia] and saying 
hello to people, even if I did not know them….I returned [to Colombia] because I was 
tired of work, of living by myself, of being alone without anybody to talk to.  In the 
United States nobody has time to be with you in tough moments—that is what made me 
[return] (quoted in Franco, 2002, 76).    
 
It is unknown how many Colombians migrants have returned to their homes due to the 
lack of social network support in South Florida, but there are likely a number of migrants with 
experiences like Christina’s. 
Expanded Push-Pull Theory 
Table 1 depicts how all the primary variables associated with the previous discussed 
theories play key roles in an Expanded Push-Pull Theory explanation of the latest wave of 
Colombian migration.  This project thus supports a number of hypotheses related to Expanded 
Push-Pull Theory.  In addition to these primary factors for explaining the migration, the pilot 
research found that the pull to South Florida over other destinations was strengthened by several 
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additional factors: (1) Spanish language—the primary language of business and social interaction 
in the community, (2) lifestyle—Colombian food, restaurants, music, dance, radio, and television 
are readily available in South Florida, (3) proximity to Colombia—only two to three hours by air 
to most major Colombia cities, (4) good weather, and (5) unfamiliarity with other regions of the 
United States (Collier and Gamarra, 2001). 
In consonance with the assumptions of comparative research (Ragin, 1994, ch 5), this 
article’s rival theories analysis reveals that a number of differing causal configurations can lead 
to the same human behavior or outcome condition—i.e., in this study the decisions of 
Colombians to migrate to South Florida and then later to decide to return to Colombia.  Classic 
Push-Pull, EVL, Social Dislocation, and Network/Social Capital theories are good for explaining 
different sections of the wave of Colombian migration—i.e., almost all migrants are affected by 
one or more of the economic, political, and social factors related to these theories.  However, in 
the search for models that explain the most variance in our dependent variables, i.e., the 
decisions to migrate in either direction, the interdisciplinary Expanded Push-Pull Theory 
emerges as the most robust.  These findings highlight that not all migrants are motivated by the 
exact same factors, and that interdisciplinary theories are often better for explaining these 
complex differences. 
Conclusion 
 As this research summary report reveals, the 1996-2002 migration of middle and upper-
middle class Colombians to South Florida is an extremely complex social phenomenon affected 
by a number of economic, political, and social factors.  This article develops that employment of 
interdisciplinary theories similar to Expanded Push-Pull Theory are best for capturing the 
complexity of such human behaviors.  The pilot and thesis research conducted for this study 
 19 
found that social dislocation caused by personal threats from violence and economic downturns 
in Colombia were the most important reasons middle and upper-middle class Colombians in our 
sample migrated.  Existing networks of family and friends provided the strongest explanation for 
why Colombians migrated to South Florida.  The unfriendly welcome of Colombians to South 
Florida; i.e., the migrants’ inabilities to obtain work visas, obtain professional employment, and 
reestablish lifestyles similar to what they left in Colombia; primarily explains why Colombians 
returned to their home country after only short periods living in South Florida.  However, this 
last findings requires additional research as only anecdotal evidence was available. 
 Substantial research remains for us to fully understand the Colombian migration to South 
Florida and the return migration to Colombia.  While this study was able to advance several rival 
theories that explain the causes of the migration and why South Florida was the migrant’s 
destination, we were not able to actually test the theories due to the study’s lack of a 
representative sample of sufficient size.  Additionally, interviews and surveys of larger 
representative samples using more precise measurement scales are required of Colombians who 
are about to migrate from Colombia, of those newly migrating to or living in South Florida, and 
of those recently returned to Colombia after attempting to settle in South Florida.  Sampling such 
“hidden” populations is extremely difficult, but not impossible and is the investment required to 
fully understand this recent social phenomenon that has drained Colombia of many of its most 
educated and experienced professionals. 
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Table 1  Competing Hypotheses from Rival Migration Theories Explaining Middle and Upper-Middle Class Colombian 
Migration to South Florida (1996-2002) 
 
 
Competing Hypotheses: Primary & Secondary 
Causal Conditions (Explanatory Factors) Shown 
 
Classic 
Push-Pull 
Exit, 
Voice, 
Loyalty 
 
Social 
Dislocation 
Network/ 
Social 
Capital 
 
Expanded 
Push-Pull 
Why are Colombians migrating to South Florida?      
1.  See better economic opportunities. P S S S P 
2.  See no solution to Colombia’s problems.  P   P 
3.  Change of social status/environment in CO.   P  P 
4.  Encouragement of social networks in SF.    P P 
5.  Personal security concerns in Colombia.  S S S P 
      
Why are migrants returning from SF to Colombia?      
1.  Renewed economic opportunities in CO. P S S S P 
2.  Have new hope for solving Colombia’s problems.  P   P 
3.  Did not establish social status or environ. In SF.   P  P 
4.  Failure to expand social networks in SF.   S P P 
5.  See improved personal security in Colombia.  S S S P 
(P) primary condition  with evidence found. (S) secondary condition with evidence found.    
Abbreviations: Colombia (CO), South Florida (SF), environment (environ.). 
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Table 2  Demographic Information on Focus Group Participants (March 2001) 
 
Number in Focus Group 26 Colombian Origin (percent)  
       Large Interior Cities* 77 
Age (years)       Small Interior Cities 19 
     Range 22-64      Coastal City 4 
     Average 38.4   
  Time in U.S. (months)  
Gender (number)       Range 1-131 
     Female 8      Average 23.8 
     Male 18   
  Professional Jobs (percent)  
Married (percent) 61.5      In Colombia 85 
       In U.S. 23 
Average Number Children     
(married persons only) 1.9 Social Class (scale 1-6)  
       In Colombian Average 4.6 
       In U.S. Average 2.8 
* Medellín (10), Bogotá (6), Cali (4). 
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Table 3  Most Influential Factors in Colombian Decisions to Migrate to South Florida 
Factor Percentage Reporting 
1.  Afraid of general violence in Colombia. 83% 
2.  Feel could live more securely in U.S. 81% 
3.  Feel no solutions for Colombia’s problems. 54% 
4.  Violence in Colombia touched you or family. 50% 
5.  Discontent with Colombia’s elected officials. 46% 
6.  See better economic opportunities in U.S. 44% 
7.  Discontent with Colombian political system. 38% 
8.  See better educational opportunities in U.S. 30% 
9.  Lack of employment opportunities in Colombia. 23% 
Source:  Focus groups conducted March 2001.  N = 26 
  
